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CIVIL PROCEDURE-Keck v. Keck, Routine or Novel
Approach to the Applicability of Full Faith and Credit to
Foreign Divorce and Custody Decrees?
At first glance, the recent Illinois Appellate. Court case of Keck v.
Keck' does not appear very significant. Judged merely by the holding,
the case seems to be little more than an application of pre-existing law
to rather commonplace facts. On a closer inspection, however, it may
appear to be overly important, a monumental departure from the exist-
ing law concerning personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts. The
fact of the matter is that Keck is neither terribly significant nor com-
pletely banal and uninteresting. Its result, the granting of full faith
and credit in accordance with the Constitution of the United States 2 to
a Nevada ex parte divorce decree, is basically a correct decision, the
interest of which lies in the misleading and often questionable rea-
soning the court used, especially with respect to divorce jurisdiction and
in personam jurisdiction pursuant to so-called "long-arm" statutes.
The facts of the case are relatively simple. In December of 1967, a
Mr. James E. Keck filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court of
Cook County on the grounds of constructive desertion and mental
cruelty. In February of the following year, his wife, Ms. Dolores F.
Keck, filed an answer and a counter-claim for separate maintenance
based on desertion. The Kecks had been married since 1948 and had
two teenage children. From 1961 until July of 1966, they lived to-
gether in Westmont, Illinois. At that time Mr. Keck moved out of the
family home and went to live by himself in an apartment located in Chi-
cago, Illinois, the apparent result of a period of marital difficulty
stretching over the preceding five years. In October of 1968, Mr. Keck
moved his residence to Nevada; and, after being domiciled there for
the required time, he began proceedings in order to obtain a divorce.
On December 5, 1968, Ms. Keck was served with both a summons and
a copy of the Nevada divorce complaint, pursuant to Nevada's "long
arm" statute.3 On December 23, 1968, a hearing was held by the trial
court in the Illinois proceedings. The plaintiff, Mr. Keck, was not pres-
ent. He was thereafter enjoined from going ahead with the Ne-
vada divorce, and an order for temporary alimony and child support
was entered against him.
1. 8 Ill. App. 3d 275, 290 N.E.2d 385 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
3. NEv. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 4(e) (2).
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On December 27, the Nevada court entered a divorce decree, giving
custody of the two children to Ms. Keck, based on Mr. Keck's com-
plaint. He then entered the divorce judgment into evidence in the
Illinois hearing and moved to dismiss. This the trial judge denied, al-
lowing instead Mr. Keck's motion to strike. Thereafter Ms. Keck was
awarded separate maintenance, custody of the two children and fifty dol-
lars per week for child support. No alimony was allowed at that time be-
cause Ms. Keck was employed. Mr. Keck's petition for divorce was, of
course, denied. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that the Ne-
vada divorce was valid and thus entitled to full faith and credit. As
such it would act "as a bar to a complaint for separate maintenance
because under the Illinois Separate Maintenance Statute . . .the right to
order separate maintenance requires the parties then to be married."4
The trial court was also instructed to enter a support order based on
the Nevada court's grant of custody to the defendant Ms. Keck.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DIVORCE
Although the holding in and especially the result of Keck is, in the
main, correct, the court committed three rather significant errors in its
reasoning. First, it incorrectly believed that a divorce decree must
satisfy two prerequisites, domicile of the plaintiff and jurisdiction over
the defendant, in order to be entitled to full faith and credit in a sister
state. This is in direct conflict with Williams v. North Carolina5 (here-
inafter referred to as Williams I), in which the Supreme Court of
the United States delineated the guidelines for when a foreign ex
parte divorce would be entitled to full faith and credit. It discarded
the old notion of matrimonial domicile and rested the jurisdictional
basis for divorce on the bona fide domicile of either or both of the
parties.6 Thus a decree of divorce granted by a state to one of its
true domiciliaries would be entitled to full faith and credit in a sister
state if accomplished with procedural due process even if the defend-
ant had not been brought under the court's jurisdiction by being per-
sonally served within the state or making a general appearance there.7
While a subsequent case8 held that the sister state could collaterally
4. Keck v. Keck, 8 Ill. App. 3d 275, 282, 290 N.E.2d 385, 390 (1972).
5. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
6. This is an express overruling of Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1905).
Haddock required that in order to render a divorce decree entitled to full faith and credit
a state other than the matrimonial domicile had to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in addition to being the bona fide residence of the plaintiff.
7. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
8. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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attack the jurisdictonal fact (domicile) upon which the divorce was
granted before extending it full faith and credit, a divorce granted
ex parte at the domicile of one of the spouses would terminate the mari-
tal status. Thus the Illinois court could and did quite properly con-
sider whether Mr. Keck had established a bona fide domicile in Nevada.
This is a factual question, and the finding that Mr. Keck had established
an actual and legitimate residence in Nevada seems to be supported
by the record, especially since "the burden of undermining the verity
which the . . . decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant."9
Up to this point the court's treatment of the issue is basically sound. It
goes on to say, however, that personal jurisdiction over the defendant
is also necessary before full faith and credit is to be allowed. As pre-
viously indicated, in light of Williams I, this is erroneous. In per-
sonam jurisdiction is needed only if the foreign decree is to dissolve the
other incidents of marriage, such as support, custody, and alimony,
when the forum state views them as property rights in the defendant
that are able to survive an ex parte proceeding.' In Estin v. Estin,"
the United States Supreme Court affirmed a New York decision which,
while granting full faith and credit to an ex parte Nevada divorce, still
held the husband liable for alimony payments pursuant to a New York
judgment obtained by the wife before the divorce. "The New York
judgment," the Supreme Court said, "is a property interest . . . juris-
diction over which . . . only arises from control or power over the
persons whose relationships are the source of the rights and obliga-
tions.""2  Again, a few years later in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,"3 the
Court reaffirmed its position. In that case, the husband acquired the
Nevada divorce decree before his wife brought suit in New York State
for separation and support. The result, however, was no different.
The Court explained:
[Slince the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction the Nevada di-
vorce court had no power to extinguish any right which she had
under the law of New York to financial support from her hus-
band.' 4
These same basic considerations apply with regard to child custody,
9. Id. at 232, 233.
10. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, § 11.5, at 316 (1968). Justice Doug-
las, in his concurring opinion in Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 281 (1944),
stated that he was "not convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal service
the decree need be given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or support
of the other spouse or the children."
11. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
12. Id. at 548.
13. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
14. Id. at 418.
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although the law in this area is more confused.'" In May v. Ander-
son,1 the Supreme Court held that a state could not cut off that
spouse's right to custody without in personam jurisdiction even if the
children were domiciled there. Such a decree would not be entitled
to full faith and credit. 7
There are three possible explanations why the Illinois Appellate
Court thought that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was nec-
essary to give the Nevada decree full faith and credit. The court may
simply have erred and been actually mistaken as to the state of the law
in this regard. Secondly, the court may not have been really talking
about in personam jurisdiction at all but rather that procedural due
process required by Williams I to validate any divorce judgment. In
other words, the court's concern may merely have been with the type
of service employed and whether it provided reasonable assurance that
notice actually be given and received. This possible explanation for
the court's behavior does not seem probable since the majority's
opinion expressly referred to the defendant being brought under the
jurisdiction of the Nevada forum pursuant to its "long arm" statute
separately and apart from its consideration of the due process require-
ment. Finally, the Illinois Appellate Court may have thought that jur-
isdiction over Ms. Keck was necessary under May v. Anderson", be-
cause the Nevada decree had also granted custody over the children
to the defendant. While this may superficially seem to be a strong,
15. The basis upon which jurisdiction is founded for custody is confused and based
more on policy than any strict adherence to law. CLARK, supra note 10, at 321, states
that:
any state which has a substantial interest in the child's welfare has jurisdic-
tion over his custody. The basis for such an interest might be the domicile of
the child within the state, his residence there, occassionally even his tempo-
rary presence there, perhaps the domicile of one or both parents in the state,
or the fact that one or both parents are before the court and subject to its
power.
16. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
17. Id. at 536. Frankfurter's concurring opinion implied that full faith and credit
does not apply to custody and that "the child's welfare . . . has such a claim upon
the state that its responsibility is obviously not foreclosed by a prior adjudication
reflecting another's state's discharge of its responsibilities at another time." This view
is not at all opposed, however, to the traditional notion of full faith and credit. As
Chief Justice Marshall said in Hampton v. M'Connel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235 (1818), "the
judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every
other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced, and
that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others,
could be pleaded in any other court in the United States." Since a custody as well as
an alimony judgment is not a final determination and may be modified with regard to
changing circumstances and since a decree need be given no more final or conclusive
effect in the forum than in the state where rendered, a custody determination may be
modified by a sister state. People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
18. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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logical possibility, there is not the slightest hint anywhere in the court's
opinion that such a consideration entered into their thinking at all.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND MINIMUM CONTACTS
The second error that Keck made was in its finding that the Ne-
vada court did acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant Ms.
Keck, whether it actually needed it or not being immaterial. The Illi-
nois court apparently assumed that the Nevada "long arm" statute
effectively subjected Ms. Keck to its power. On this very point, the
court made its position clear:
[Slhe was personally served with both a summons and a copy of
the Nevada divorce complaint. . . . Such service was pursuant to
the Nevada 'long arm' statute. . . and thereby brought the defend-
ant under the jurisdiction of the Nevada court. 19
However, the majority failed to consider one of the essential prerequi-
sites for in personam jurisdiction-relationship (i.e., minimum con-
tacts). The court correctly observed that such service of process as
was rendered to Ms. Keck more than adequately satisfied the due pro-
cess requirement for notice,20 but nowhere did the court discuss Ms.
Keck's contacts with the state of Nevada and whether they were or
were not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,2' decided that:
[I]n order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he [must] have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' 22
Thus it is not enough that service of process constitute actual notice if
there are not sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum.
It then becomes essential for the defendant to purposefully avail him-
self "of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws."23
19. Keck v. Keck, 8 Il. App. 3d 275, 280, 281, 290 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1972).
20. People ex rel. Loeser v. Loeser, 51 111. 2d 567, 572 (1972):
The requisites of due process are satisfied if the manner of effecting service of
summons gives reasonable assurance that notice will actually be given and the
person against whom the action is brought is given reasonable time to appear
and defend on the merits.
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. Id. at 316.
23. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); accord, McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see also Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437(1952); Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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What are Ms. Keck's contacts with the state of Nevada? A very gen-
erous estimation would be that they are almost nonexistent. She was
not served in that state. In fact, as far as the record shows, she was
never in Nevada at all. At the very least, she failed to carry on any
activities there nor did she maintain any sort of domicile. The only con-
tacts she had with that state whatsoever were through her husband who
went there without her and through the Nevada process served on her
in Illinois. Never before have the Illinois courts allowed facts such
as these to subject an individual to a foreign jurisdiction, even under
its own "long arm" statute24 which "contemplates the exertion of jur-
isdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permitted by the
due process clause."25 The two most important cases which deal
with the problem of minimum contacts and the Illinois statute are
Nelson v. Miller26 and Gray v. American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp.2" The Nelson case dealt with section 17(b) of the
Illinois statute, covering tortious acts committed within the state. There
a delivery man's actions in Illinois causing the plaintiff's injuries were
held sufficient to subject a Wisconsin appliance dealer to Illinois' jur-
isdiction. "While he was here," the court reasoned, "the employee and
the defendant enjoyed the benefit and protection of the laws of Illi-
nois, including the right to resort to our courts."28  This test for es-
tablishing minimum contacts (i.e., invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of the forum) was expanded to the fullest possible extent in
Gray. The defendant therein had manufactured a defective valve in
Ohio, which was later built into an hot water heater in Pennsylvania.
This heater was thereafter sold to an Illinois resident and eventually
exploded within that state. This series of events constituted the only
contact the foreign corporation had within Illinois; yet the Supreme
Court of Illinois refused to apply a "mechanical formula" and instead
made "the relevant inquiry . .. whether [the] defendant engaged in
some act or conduct by which he may be said to have invoked the
benefits and protections of the law of the forum. '29 Under such a test,
the Gray court had no trouble finding sufficient contacts.
The question now remains whether Ms. Keck's conduct can in any
way be deemed to have invoked the benefits of Nevada law. The an-
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1971).
25. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il1. 2d 432, 436, 176
N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961).
26. 11 Il. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
27. 22111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
28. Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 390, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957).
29. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 II. 2d 432, 440,
176 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1961).
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swer must obviously be no. She was never under the protection of
the Nevada courts and did nothing to indicate a desire or willingness to
be so. By staying out of the state entirely, by not appearing in
the divorce proceedings being conducted there, her actions indicate,
if anything, a revoking instead of an invoking of Nevada's legal
protection. In fact, under a very similar fact situation, another Illi-
nois Appellate Court failed to find sufficient minimum contacts. In
Hawes v. Hawes,3" the court held that where the wife maintained no
matrimonial domicile, never resided and committed no act within the
forum, and failed to follow her husband into the state, sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the state did not exist to support jurisdiction of
the trial court concerning custody and alimony questions.8' The
wife therein had been personally served pursuant to section 17 (1) (e)
of the Illinois "long arm" statute. The couple had been living to-
gether in Michigan, but the wife failed to accompany her husband
into Illinois. Plaintiff argued that the statute covered such a sit-
uation since, technically, Ms. Hawes could have been found to have de-
serted her husband in Illinois' jurisdiction by not coming with him.
However, the court held that there was not a sufficient nexus between
the state and the defendant to meet the constitutional requirement.
Mr. Hawes' argument that the Gray case, by analogy, provided such a
connection was rejected on the ground that the defendant had in no
way availed herself of the protection of Illinois law.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CUSTODY
The third error committed by Keck was in granting full faith and
credit to that part of the Nevada divorce which had awarded to Ms.
Keck the custody of the children. Lacking those minimum contacts
with the defendant which are needed in order to subject her to its
power, the Nevada court was therefore without jurisdiction to litigate
the custody of the children. Personal control over either the defend-
ant or the children themselves is needed in Illinois in order to grant
child custody. Both were absent in Keck.12  In fact, in Hawes v.
Hawes,33 the Illinois Appellate Court vacated that portion of an Illi-
nois divorce decree granting custody and alimony on the ground that
it was obtained without such jurisdiction. On the other hand, People
30. 130 Il1. App. 2d 546, 263 N.E.2d 625 (1970).
31. Id. at 548, 263 N.E.2d at 627.
32. Since the children were always with Ms. Keck, the same considerations with
respect to minimum contacts with Nevada would apply to them.
33. 130 Ill. App. 2d 546, 263 N.E.2d 625 (1970).
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ex rel. Loeser v. Loeser34 extended full faith and credit to a foreign
judgment which had also awarded custody but which had managed to
acquire in personam jurisdiction over the defendant spouse. 3' The
significance of Keck's error in this regard, however, is mitigated by the
fact that the result would have been no different even if the court had
vacated that portion of the divorce decree which dealt with custody
since both the Illinois trial court and the Nevada divorce court had
placed the custody of the children in the hands of the defendant. Thus
Ms. Keck did not attempt to have the custody ruling overturned. She
wanted the Nevada judgment to be denied full faith and credit in
its entirety. This being the case, the Illinois Appellate Court's error
was one only of form and not substance.
CONCLUSION
Keck is a case which its own inherent ambiguity precludes from be-
coming either an aberration or a pioneer. It skirts both significance
and mere error, never quite totally embracing either. While it cor-
rectly held that the plaintiff's foreign divorce decree was entitled to
full faith and credit, it partially based its decision on a non-existent re-
quirement of personal power over the defendant. Moreover, the court
then erred in finding such personal jurisdiction without the necessary
relationship with the forum, treating instead service of process pursu-
ant to a state's "long arm" statute almost as a substitute for or a con-
clusive presumption of minimum contacts. While Keck was incor-
rect in holding that the custody provision of the Nevada judgment was
entitled to full faith and credit, it was a mistake without meaning since
the result would have been no different if that portion of the decree
had been vacated. Either way, Ms. Keck would have been awarded cus-
tody over the children. The court was correct in holding the valid for-
eign divorce to be a bar to ordering separate maintenance;36 but even
34. 51111. 2d 567 (1972).
35. Illinois, of course, follows the usual rule that a custody decision is never final
and always reopenable if the circumstances warrant it. Id. at 569-70; accord, People
ex rel. Morris v. Morris, 44 111. 2d 66, 254 N.E.2d 478 (1969); Faris v. Faris, 35 Ill.
2d 305, 220 N.E.2d 210 (1966); People ex rel. Stockham v. Schaedel, 340 Ill. 560, 173
N.E. 172 (1930). As indicated in supra note 17, this is not contrary to the mandate
of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
36. Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 39 N.E. 595 (1895), held that a valid
foreign ex parte divorce was a complete bar to a separate maintenance action brought
after the divorce had been granted. This result was substantially weakened in Pope v.
Pope, 2 I11. 2d 152, 117 N.E.2d 65 (1954). Therein the husband had not obtained the
divorce until after his wife had already been awarded a judgment for support. The court
held that the foreign decree, although valid as to capacity to remarry, did not terminate
the wife's right to support unless made with personal jurisdiction over both parties. A
separate maintenance decree will be cut off by a valid foreign divorce only where the
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though such would probably not have precluded an award for ali-
mony,37 the question was not even raised because the trial court had
found Ms. Keck not to be entitled to alimony since she was working.
The real interest of the case is in the way it treated a foreign for-
um's acquiring of personal jurisdiction without having or without even
discussing minimum contacts. The implications of such a ruling could
have been considerable; going, as it would, right into the teeth of
previous United States Supreme Court rulings. It may have signified
the next step in the erosion of the principles laid down in Pennoyer
v. Neff. 38  It could also have been simply an error, the inevitable
product of ambiguity. However, since personal jurisdiction was not
really required for the results obtained, the significance of the court's
discussion in that area is reduced, while still something more than a
mere curiosity, to something less than it might otherwise have been.
ANTHONY VALIULIS
foreign court had personal jurisdiction over both spouses or where the divorce was ob-
tained at the insistence of the party whose rights are involved, Harper v. Rooker, 52
Ill. 370 (1869); Earles v. Earles, 343 Ill. App. 447, 99 N.E.2d 359 (1951); or where
the defendant appeared or was personally served, accord, Buck v. Buck, 337 111. App. 520,
86 N.E.2d 415 (1949); Shaw v. Shaw, 332 Ill. App. 442, 75 N.E.2d 411 (1947).
Of course, if there are to be no support payments a valid divorce renders meaningless
any order for mere separate maintenance.
37. In Darnell v. Darnell, 212 Ill. App. 601 (1918), the court held that where a di-
vorce has been granted in another state which did not have jurisdiction over the de-
fendant, the complainant may afterward sue for support and maintenance in Illinois if
the defendant resides or has property there.
38. 95 U.S. 714 (1877): To have validity, a personal judgment must be personally
served within the state or the defendant must appear.
602
Vol. 4: 594
